Do private listings sell for less than those publicly marketed?
In
the
ongoing
debate
over
NAR’s
Clear
Cooperation
Policy,
one
question
looms
large:
who
really
benefits
when
a
single
agent
or
brokerage
represents
both
sides
of
a
real
estate
transaction?
Many
private
listings
ended
up
being
double-ended
deals.
Proponents
of
exclusive
listings
argue
that
consumers
gain
a
streamlined
process
and
increased
privacy.
They
point
to
programs
like
Compass
Private
Exclusives,
which
allow
sellers
to
“pre-market”
their
homes
to
an
internal
network
before
listing
publicly.
However,
Compass
itself
acknowledges
in
their
disclosure
that
limiting
exposure
by
not
listing
on
the
MLS
can
reduce
the
number
of
showings,
offers,
and
the
final
sale
price.
Critics,
meanwhile,
argue
that
exclusive
listings,
especially
at
scale,
create
an
uneven
playing
field.
They
contend
that
private
networks
disproportionately
benefit
the
brokerages
and
agents
who
control
the
listing
pipeline,
while
also
giving
the
largest
firms
the
greatest
advantage
in
agent
recruitment
and
retention.
Many
also
point
to
the
fact
that
private
listings
essentially
lock
out
lower-income
buyers
who
rely
on
open
MLS
access.
The
result?
A
narrowing
of
opportunity
and
reduced
market
visibility
that
runs
counter
to
the
spirit
of
fair
housing.
Adding
to
the
concern,
some
critics
suggest
that
double-ended
deals,
often
a
byproduct
of
these
exclusive
environments,
may
result
in
lower
sale
prices
for
sellers.
In
this
light,
the
strategy
is
seen
by
some
as
a
way
to
maximize
control
for
firms
while
potentially
limiting
upside
for
consumers.
Now,
new
data
provides
an
empirical
lens
through
which
to
evaluate
these
claims,
and
the
results
are
eye-opening.
The
market
performance
of
double-ended
deals
Analyzing
thousands
of
transactions
from
2018
to
2024
across
major
firms,
one
key
trend
emerges:
on
average,
double-ended
deals
underperform.
-
Double-ended
deals
sold
for
6.36%
over
list
price
on
average. -
Non-double-ended
deals
sold
for
8.06%
over
list
price.
That
may
not
seem
dramatic
at
first
glance,
but
it
equates
to
a
21%
lower
price
performance
in
relative
terms
for
consumers
using
the
same
agent
for
both
sides.
And
while
there
were
isolated
outliers,
in
the
vast
majority
of
company-year
combinations,
double-ended
deals
fetched
less
than
their
non-double-ended
counterparts.
The
data
also
reveals
a
troubling
pattern:
the
more
frequently
a
firm
works
on
both
sides
of
the
transaction,
the
more
likely
those
deals
are
to
yield
below-market
outcomes.
In
firms
with
double-ending
rates
consistently
above
30%,
the
performance
gap
widened
even
further.
A
case
study
in
scale
and
strategy
In
select
markets
and
certain
years,
one
large,
well-known
firm
has
exhibited
a
significantly
higher
share
of
double-ended
deals;
roughly
double
the
average
observed
among
the
top
10
brokerages
we
examined
across
multiple
markets.
Despite
its
size
and
scale,
the
firm’s
double-ended
deals
underperformed
its
non-double-ended
deals
in
nearly
every
year
of
the
analysis.
Even
during
the
ultra-competitive
markets
of
2021
and
2022,
when
bidding
wars
were
common
and
many
homes
sold
far
above
list
price,
double-ended
transactions
showed
more
muted
gains.
Listing
share
as
a
lever
To
understand
how
this
dynamic
unfolds,
it’s
important
to
examine
where
certain
firms
hold
dominant
listing
market
share.
In
Boston,
for
example,
one
firm
controlled
17.1%
of
total
market
volume
and
an
industry-leading
11.3%
of
all
listings.
Similar
patterns
emerge
in
markets
like
Fort
Lauderdale,
San
Francisco,
and
Saint
Petersburg,
where
concentrated
listing
control
gives
firms
a
strategic
advantage
in
facilitating
in-house
transactions
and
internal
matchmaking.
That’s
not
necessarily
bad,
until
you
look
at
the
price
data.
The
findings
suggest
that
high
double-ending
rates
correlate
not
with
stronger
results
for
sellers,
but
with
the
opposite.
In
many
cases,
double-ended
deals
sold
closer
to
list
price
or
even
below,
especially
in
firms
that
had
greater
control
over
listing
inventory.
Policy
in
context:
what
happens
if
Clear
Cooperation
fades?
This
is
more
than
a
data
issue
—
it’s
a
policy
issue.
The
Clear
Cooperation
Policy
was
designed
to
ensure
that
publicly
marketed
properties
reach
the
widest
possible
audience
via
the
MLS,
enhancing
competition
and
consumer
visibility.
Some
companies
are
now
challenging
that
policy.
Their
approach
centers
on
private
listing
networks
and
internal
exclusivity,
aiming
to
deliver
speed,
control,
and
convenience.
But
these
benefits
may
come
at
a
hidden
cost.
The
data
poses
a
difficult
but
important
question:
if
double-ended
deals,
which
are
more
common
in
exclusive
listing
environments,
routinely
yield
lower
sale
prices,
are
we
truly
serving
the
consumer?
The
path
forward:
transparency
and
competition
A
more
private
process
may
appeal
to
certain
clients,
but
it
should
not
come
at
the
expense
of
market
outcomes.
When
fewer
buyers
see
a
listing,
fewer
offers
are
made.
Less
competition
often
means
lower
final
prices.
While
no
policy
is
without
flaws,
the
principle
of
broad
access
and
transparency
remains
foundational
to
a
fair
marketplace.
And
based
on
years
of
transaction
data,
open
competition
continues
to
produce
stronger
results
than
controlled
exclusivity.
As
the
industry
debates
the
future
of
Clear
Cooperation,
one
thing
is
certain:
the
best
outcomes
arise
not
from
behind
closed
doors,
but
from
an
open
market
where
every
buyer
gets
a
fair
shot.
Diana
Zaya
is
the
founder
and
CEO
of
Maverick
Systems.